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[1213] 
Justice Ginsburg and Religious Liberty 
John D. Inazu* 
Justice Ginsburg has left an important mark on many areas of the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence, but she has written relatively little in the area of religion. This relatively 
small footprint increased significantly in the opinion that she wrote in the Court's 2010 
decision in Christian Legal Society v. Martinez. This Article examines three strands of 
Justice Ginsburg’s jurisprudence leading up to that opinion: religion, government 
funding of expression, and equality. It first traces Justice Ginsburg’s religious liberty 
views through four facets of her legal career: her role as an advocate, her opinions on 
the D.C. Circuit, her Supreme Court nomination testimony, and her opinions and votes 
on the Supreme Court. It turns next to her views about government funding of 
expression. It then examines Justice Ginsburg’s long-standing commitment to principles 
of equality. Finally, it considers the interplay of these three strands in Martinez and 
offers three observations. First, because Martinez pitted religious liberty against liberal 
equality, it forced Justice Ginsburg to make a choice that prioritized one over the other 
and may have caused her to overlook some of the religious dimensions of the case. 
Second, Justice Ginsburg’s previous views about government funding of speech should 
have caused her greater concern over the implications of unconstitutional conditions in 
this case. Third, Martinez skirted the preceding tensions, relying instead on doctrinal 
intricacies that detracted from the core issues raised in this case. 
 
 *  Associate Professor of Law and Political Science, Washington University. Thanks to Chad 
Flanders, Greg Magarian, Susan Appleton, Deborah Dinner, Neil Richards, Kevin Pybas, Chris Lund, 
Bryan Lammon, and Neil Siegel for helpful suggestions on earlier versions of this Article. I am 
indebted to Professor Joan Williams for inviting me to contribute to this issue and to the editors and 
staff of the Hastings Law Journal for their assistance. Thanks to Lila Zhao, Catherine Crane, and 
William Osberghaus for excellent research assistance. 
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Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg has left an important mark on many 
areas of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, but she has written 
relatively little in the area of religion. During her nearly twenty years on 
the Court, she has authored only one majority opinion directly 
addressing either the Free Exercise Clause or the Establishment Clause 
of the First Amendment.1 
To some observers of the Court’s religion jurisprudence, this 
relatively small footprint increased significantly with her 2010 opinion in 
Christian Legal Society v. Martinez.2 That decision upheld the University 
of California, Hastings College of the Law’s denial of “official 
recognition” to a student group that limited its membership to Christians 
who adhered to a moral code that included a prohibition against 
homosexual conduct.3 Although Martinez reads more like a free speech 
than a free exercise decision, the case involves some of the most difficult 
and most troubling aspects of religious liberty today.4 In particular, 
 
 1. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005) (upholding a provision of the Religious Land Use 
and Institutionalized Persons Act); see infra notes 80–85 and accompanying text. Justice Ginsburg also 
wrote the majority opinion in Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88 (2004), a Tax Injunction Act case that 
tangentially addressed an Establishment Clause claim. She authored dissents in Agostini v. Felton, 521 
U.S. 203 (1997), and Capitol Square Review & Advisory Board v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995). 
 2. 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010). 
 3. Id. at 2978. 
 4. I have written critically of the holding and reasoning of Martinez. See John D. Inazu, 
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Martinez’s dismissal of the religious association claim dealt a severe blow 
to religious liberty advocates who have struggled to find alternate means 
of protecting religious expression in the twenty years since the Court’s 
decision in Employment Division v. Smith, which lowered the level of 
constitutional scrutiny applied to generally applicable, neutral laws that 
burden the free exercise of religion.5 
Martinez is bad news for religious liberty, but it need not cast the 
definitive gloss on Justice Ginsburg’s views on the subject for at least two 
reasons.6 First, the case involves the tension between religious liberty and 
Justice Ginsburg’s core concern with equality. Second, Martinez 
addresses the relationship between expression and government funding,7 
an area in which the Court has yet to offer much helpful guidance. 
Unfortunately, rather than squarely confront these constitutional 
tensions, Justice Ginsburg’s opinion moves too quickly past them and 
elides her own caution that “[d]octrinal limbs too swiftly shaped, 
experience teaches, may prove unstable.”8 
To support these claims, I examine three strands of Justice 
Ginsburg’s jurisprudence leading up to Martinez: religion, government 
funding of expression, and equality.9 In Part I of this Article, I trace 
 
Liberty’s Refuge: The Forgotten Freedom of Assembly 5, 145–49 (2012) [hereinafter Inazu, 
Liberty’s Refuge]; John D. Inazu, The Unsettling “Well-Settled” Law of Freedom of Association, 
43 Conn. L. Rev. 149, 195–97 (2010) [hereinafter Inazu, The Unsettling “Well-Settled” Law]. 
 5. See 494 U.S. 872 (1990). The claim to religious association was strengthened by the Court’s 
recent decision in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 706 (2012) 
(“[T]he text of the First Amendment itself . . . gives special solicitude to the rights of religious 
organizations.”). The Court in Hosanna-Tabor recognized a broad ministerial exception to 
employment discrimination law based on a “religious organization’s freedom to select its own 
ministers.” Id. Given the religious association interests at issue in both cases, Hosanna-Tabor and 
Martinez may be in tension. 
 6. Only a handful of scholars have ventured an assessment of Justice Ginsburg’s religion 
opinions. See, e.g., Kevin Pybas, Religious Groups in a Free Society, 86 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. 685, 692 
(2009) (citing Kathleen M. Sullivan, Justice Scalia and the Religion Clauses, 22 U. Haw. L. Rev. 449, 
457 (2000)) (describing Justice Ginsburg as adhering to a “weak free exercise/strong establishment 
approach”). Kevin Pybas correctly notes that Justice Ginsburg has “endorsed Sullivan’s claim that the 
prohibition on establishment affirmatively establishes a secular moral public order.” Id. at 692–93 n.30 
(citing Pinette, 515 U.S. at 817 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and 
Liberal Democracy, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 195, 197–214 (1992))). 
 7. 130 S. Ct. at 2985–86.  
 8. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1185, 1198 (1992). 
 9. In addition to these three lines of cases, Martinez drew substantially from two others: cases 
addressing student groups seeking official recognition at public universities and cases establishing the 
doctrinal framework for limited-public-forum analysis. The former precede Justice Ginsburg’s tenure 
on the Court and thus do not shed light on her perspectives. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 
(1981); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972). The latter include some cases decided since Justice 
Ginsburg has been on the Court, see, for example, Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 
533 U.S. 98 (2001), and Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995), 
but I omit a separate treatment of them for two reasons. First, the doctrinal framework that emerges 
from these cases is relatively straightforward: Content-neutral laws generally survive scrutiny, and 
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Justice Ginsburg’s religion views through four facets of her legal career: 
her role as an advocate, her opinions on the D.C. Circuit, her Supreme 
Court nomination testimony, and her opinions and votes on the Supreme 
Court. In Part II, I turn to her views about government funding of 
expression, relying principally upon her dissent in DKT Memorial Fund 
v. Agency for International Development.10 Then, in Part III, I examine 
her long-standing commitment to principles of liberal equality. Finally, in 
Part IV, I consider the interplay of these three strands in Martinez and 
offer three observations. First, because Martinez pitted religious liberty 
against liberal equality, it forced Justice Ginsburg to make a choice that 
prioritized one over the other and may have caused her to overlook some 
of the religious dimensions of the case. Second, Justice Ginsburg’s 
previously expressed views about government funding of speech should 
have caused her greater concern over the implications of unconstitutional 
conditions in this case. Third, Martinez skirted the preceding tensions, 
relying instead on doctrinal intricacies that detracted from the core issues 
raised in this case. 
Martinez should not have prioritized liberal equality over religious 
liberty, it should not have avoided an unconstitutional conditions 
analysis, and it should not have sidestepped the underlying values clash. 
This criticism is not for Justice Ginsburg alone, nor is it limited to the 
five-member majority in Martinez. The Supreme Court has for decades 
been less than clear about the interrelation among religious liberty, 
associational freedom, and government funding. Martinez emerges from 
within the murky intersection of these constitutional doctrines. And yet 
there is another sense in which this opinion authored by Justice Ginsburg 
must be situated within the rest of her own jurisprudence. This Article 
begins that effort. 
I.  Religion 
A. Advocacy 
One of Justice Ginsburg’s earliest encounters with a religious liberty 
claim came with her involvement in the case of Susan Struck, an Air 
Force officer who became pregnant and refused on religious grounds to 
have an abortion.11 Struck’s refusal to end her pregnancy subjected her to 
discharge under military regulations.12 Ginsburg, then general counsel for 
 
viewpoint discriminatory laws generally do not. Second, to the extent that public-forum analysis is 
relevant to the issues addressed in this Article, it is encompassed in the religion cases that I address. 
See infra notes 71–79 and accompanying text (discussing Rosenberger and Good News Club).  
 10. 887 F.2d 275 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
 11. Struck v. Sec’y of Def., 460 F.2d 1372, 1376 (9th Cir. 1972). 
 12. Id. at 1373–74. 
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the Women’s Rights Project of the ACLU, authored the merits brief 
when Struck’s case reached the Supreme Court.13 She wrote that “the 
challenged regulation operates with particularly brutal force against 
women of [Roman Catholic] faith” and “pit[s] [Struck’s] Air Force 
career against . . . her religious conscience.”14 Importantly, Ginsburg 
insisted, “While the regulation challenged by Captain Struck is not 
designed to interfere with religious beliefs, if in effect it does so interfere, 
it must be supported by necessity of the kind totally absent here.”15 
It is important not to make too much of Justice Ginsburg’s advocacy 
arguments in a case from the 1970s. For one thing, we cannot readily 
attribute to her everything that she asserted on a client’s behalf. Yet 
there remains a sense in which her descriptions (“particularly brutal 
force” and “necessity of the kind totally absent here”) reflect not just the 
rhetorical flair of a skilled advocate but also a deeper empathy for claims 
of religious conscience. 
B. Judge Ginsburg 
Prior to her elevation to the Supreme Court, Ginsburg sat for 
thirteen years on the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit. Her views about religious liberty emerge in three of the opinions 
she authored during that time: her majority opinions in Olsen v. Drug 
Enforcement Administration16 and Leahy v. District of Columbia,17 and 
her dissent in Goldman v. Secretary of Defense.18 
Judge Ginsburg’s first religion opinion came in her dissent from the 
denial of an en banc request in Goldman.19 Simcha Goldman, a Jewish 
Air Force officer, alleged that a military regulation that prevented him 
from wearing a yarmulke while in uniform violated his free exercise of 
 
 13. Brief for the Petitioner, Struck v. Sec’y of Def., 409 U.S. 1071 (1972) (No. 72-178). Although 
the Supreme Court vacated and remanded Struck’s case for the Ninth Circuit to consider mootness 
after the government changed its position on discharging Struck, see Struck, 409 U.S. at 1071, 
Ginsburg’s brief remains important and has recently drawn increased scholarly attention. See, e.g., Neil 
S. Siegel & Reva B. Siegel, Struck by Stereotype: Ruth Bader Ginsburg on Pregnancy Discrimination as 
Sex Discrimination, 59 Duke L.J. 771 (2010). 
 14. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 13, at 56. 
 15. Id. Struck preceded the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Employment Division v. Smith, 
494 U.S. 872 (1990), which held that neutral laws of general applicability would be subject only to 
rational basis review under a free exercise challenge. Id. at 882–90. But because the Air Force 
regulation was a federal restriction on free exercise, today it likely would be decided under the 
standard set forth in the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, a standard similar to the one 
upon which Ginsburg relied in her Struck brief. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2010) (providing for strict 
scrutiny of substantial government burdens on the exercise of religion). 
 16. 878 F.2d 1458 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
 17. 833 F.2d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
 18. 739 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc). 
 19. Id. at 660 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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religion.20 The case eventually reached the Supreme Court, where Chief 
Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion denied Goldman’s claim.21 In 
response, Congress enacted legislation to ensure that “a member of the 
armed forces may wear an item of religious apparel while wearing the 
uniform of the member’s armed force.”22 
On its way to the Supreme Court, Goldman’s case came through the 
D.C. Circuit. After a panel of that court ruled against him, Goldman 
unsuccessfully sought en banc review.23 Three judges dissented from the 
denial of the en banc petition: Kenneth Starr, Antonin Scalia, and Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg. Judge Starr’s dissent concluded: 
It is time to recall that the First Amendment means more than a strong 
and free press. It means more than protecting the right peaceably to 
assemble. It means more than preventing the National Government 
from establishing a state religion. It means the inalienable right of all 
our people as free men and women to worship God. That is what this 
country is all about. Dr. Goldman has been required to render to 
Caesar far too much for far too little reason.24 
Judge Ginsburg, joined by Judge Scalia, excoriated the “‘callous 
indifference’ to Dr. Goldman’s religious faith” that “runs counter to ‘the 
best of our traditions’ to ‘accommodate[] the public service to the[] 
spiritual needs [of our people].’”25 She emphasized that she dissented 
“[f]or the reasons indicated in Judge Starr’s eloquent statement.”26 No 
longer an advocate, echoes of Struck resounded in Judge Ginsburg’s 
Goldman dissent. 
Judge Ginsburg next wrote in a religion case three years after 
Goldman, in Leahy v. District of Columbia.27 The case involved a free 
exercise challenge to the District of Columbia’s requirement that 
applicants for driver’s licenses provide their Social Security numbers.28 
The legal analysis in the opinion is unremarkable—it corrects the lower 
court’s error on an issue of civil procedure.29 But what is more interesting 
about this brief opinion is the empathy that Judge Ginsburg displayed for 
John Leahy’s religious beliefs. She took time to explore “[t]he theological 
 
 20. Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 504 (1986), aff’g Goldman v. Sec’y of Def., 734 F.2d 
1531 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
 21. Id. at 509–10. 
 22. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-180, 
§ 508, 101 Stat. 1019, 1086 (1987) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 774 (2010)). 
 23. Goldman v. Sec’y of Def., 739 F.2d 657, 658 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc). 
 24. Id. at 659–60 (Starr, J., dissenting). 
 25. Id. at 660 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (alterations in original) (quoting Zorach v. Clauson, 
343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952)). 
 26. Id. 
 27. 833 F.2d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
 28. Id. at 1047. 
 29. Id. at 1048–49. 
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roots of Leahy’s asserted belief.”30 Instead of dismissing or ignoring those 
beliefs, she set forth a careful description of them. As she wrote, the 
roots of Leahy’s belief 
lie in the New Testament Book of Revelation which, in its thirteenth 
chapter, refers to two beasts. Revelation prophesies that those who 
receive the mark of the second beast shall be condemned to eternal 
damnation. This mark is characterized as a number required for buying 
and selling. Leahy avers that “social security numbers have come to 
share many of the characteristics of the mark of the beast, and that 
social security numbers may therefore be the mark of the beast.” On 
that account, Leahy refused to provide his social security number when 
applying for a driver’s license.31 
This brief description emerges from within a short and legally 
uninteresting case. But it reflects Judge Ginsburg’s recognition that 
sometimes assessing a religious liberty claim requires probing the 
underlying belief.32 
In 1989, Judge Ginsburg wrote the majority opinion in Olsen v. 
Drug Enforcement Administration.33 Carl Olsen sought a religious-use 
exemption from federal drug laws prior to the Supreme Court’s practical 
end to such exemptions in Employment Division v. Smith.34 Olsen was a 
member and priest of the Ethiopian Zion Coptic Church, which boasted 
a U.S. membership of somewhere between 100 and 200 adherents.35 As 
the government conceded for purposes of the case, the church viewed 
marijuana as its primary sacrament, which was to be “combined with 
tobacco and smoked ‘continually all day, through church services, 
through everything we do.’”36 Olsen and other church members had 
received multiple federal convictions for importing twenty tons of 
marijuana.37 Following these convictions, Olsen petitioned the Drug 
Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) to grant an exemption permitting 
the church’s sacramental use of marijuana.38 He raised two arguments: 
(1) the Free Exercise Clause required the exemption; and (2) the 
 
 30. Id. at 1047–48 (emphasis added). 
 31. Id. at 1048 (citations omitted). 
 32. Cf. Nomination of Ruth Bader Ginsburg, to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the 
United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 181 (1993) [hereinafter 
Hearings] (statement of Judge Ginsburg) (“Leahy’s religious belief involved a rejection of 
identification with a Social Security number. If he were to use that number to identify himself, he 
would very substantially reduce his chances for an after-life. That was his religious belief.”). 
 33. 878 F.2d 1458 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
 34. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 35. Olsen, 878 F.2d at 1459. 
 36. Id. (quoting State v. Olsen, 315 N.W.2d 1, 7 (Iowa 1982)); id. at 1460 (“[The DEA] accepted, 
for purposes of its decision, that the Ethiopian Zion Coptic Church is a bona fide religion with 
marijuana as its sacrament.”). 
 37. Id. at 1459. 
 38. Id.  
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Establishment Clause and Equal Protection Clause required that the 
DEA grant an exemption similar to the one given to the Native 
American Church for its sacramental use of peyote.39 
Judge Ginsburg’s opinion for the court rejected both of Olsen’s 
claims.40 Quoting from a recent Supreme Court opinion, she observed 
that “certain overt acts prompted by religious beliefs or principles” can 
be regulated when they pose “some substantial threat to public safety, 
peace or order.”41 Based upon this language, and finding that importing 
marijuana poses a “substantial threat to public safety, peace or order,” 
she rejected Olsen’s first argument.42 Turning to Olsen’s second 
argument, Judge Ginsburg observed that “in cases of this character, 
establishment clause and equal protection analyses converge.”43 She gave 
short shrift to Olsen’s claim, suggesting an apples-to-oranges comparison 
between peyote and marijuana: During a seven-year period preceding 
the litigation, she noted, the DEA seized nineteen pounds of peyote but 
more than fifteen million pounds of marijuana.44 
Even before more recent developments in free exercise 
jurisprudence, Olsen is an easy case. Religious arguments for exemptions 
from marijuana use laws raise intriguing questions about the nature of 
religious practice, but as a practical matter, they get nowhere.45 A broad 
cross section of American society would have no trouble concluding that 
a group that imports twenty tons of marijuana into the United States 
poses a “substantial threat to public safety, peace or order.”46 But Olsen 
remains an interesting case that sheds light on Judge Ginsburg’s religious 
liberty views. The key insights are buried in her rejection of Olsen’s 
 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 1463–65. Judge Buckley dissented on Establishment Clause grounds, arguing that the 
DEA’s denial of Olsen’s exemption request “create[d] a clear-cut denominational preference in favor 
of the Native American Church, which has been granted such an exemption.” Id. at 1468 (Buckley, J., 
dissenting). 
 41. Id. at 1461–62 (majority opinion) (quoting Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660, 670 n.13 (1988)). 
The threat in Olsen seemed clear enough,  
in light of evidence that in years past, the church’s “[c]hecks on distribution of cannabis to 
nonbelievers in the faith [were] minimal,” there was “easy access to cannabis for a child who 
had absolutely no interest in learning the religion,” and “[m]embers [partook] of cannabis 
anywhere, not just within the confines of a church facility.”  
Id. at 1462 (alterations in original) (quoting Town v. State ex rel. Reno, 377 So. 2d 648, 649, 651 (Fla. 
1979)). 
 42. Id. at 1463. 
 43. Id. at 1463 n.5 (citing Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 694, 696 (1970) (Harlan, J., 
concurring)). 
 44. Id. at 1463. 
 45. See, e.g., United States v. Kuch, 288 F. Supp. 439 (D.D.C. 1968) (rejecting a free exercise 
defense in a prosecution for marijuana and LSD use); Lineker v. State, Nos. A-8957, A-8967, 2010 WL 
200014 (Alaska Ct. App. Jan. 20, 2010) (rejecting a free exercise defense in a marijuana prosecution). 
 46. See Olsen, 878 F.2d at 1461–62. 
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attempt to bring the practices of the Ethiopian Zion Coptic Church 
closer in line with those of the Native American Church: 
The peyote exemption was accorded to the Native American Church 
for a traditional, precisely circumscribed ritual. In that ritual, the 
peyote itself is an object of worship; for members of the Native 
American Church, use of peyote outside the ritual is sacrilegious. Thus 
the church, for all purposes other than the special, stylized ceremony, 
reinforced the state’s prohibition. In contrast, the Ethiopian Zion 
Coptic Church, as earlier observed, teaches that marijuana is properly 
smoked “continually all day,” as Olsen himself stated, “through 
everything that we do.” True, for purposes of the exemption requested, 
Olsen narrowed the permission he sought to track the one accorded 
the Native American Church. But “narrow” use, concededly, is not his 
religion’s tradition.47 
This description suggests two possible angles to Judge Ginsburg’s 
approach to religious liberty. The first is her suggestion that a religious 
practice that “reinforced the state’s prohibition” on illegal drug use 
might for this reason be more amenable to constitutional protection. 
Judge Ginsburg’s description could almost be read to suggest that a 
religious practice that toes a line closer to the state’s norms might be 
intrinsically more worthy of protection. But the disruption that a 
religious practice poses to the state’s norms must factor into the weight 
of the government’s interest in restricting the practice, not whether the 
practice warrants constitutional protection in the first place. 
The second insight into Judge Ginsburg’s religious liberty views 
appears in the final sentence of the paragraph quoted above. In asserting 
that Olsen’s requested exemption fell outside of his religion’s tradition, 
Judge Ginsburg purports to know what constitutes that tradition. But 
Olsen’s narrowing of his religious practice might represent continuity 
with rather than a break from tradition—particularly if the tradition 
depended upon this narrowing for its survival.48 This observation is easily 
obscured by Olsen’s colorful facts, but it serves as reminder that judicial 
descriptions about the content of religious belief can obscure the clash of 
 
 47. Id. at 1464 (citations omitted). 
 48. Frederick Gedicks poignantly conveys this perspective in his description of the Mormon 
Church’s decision to abandon its polygamist practices in the face of intense persecution by the federal 
government:  
  When all its efforts failed, the church came face to face with one of the most serious 
crises of religious conscience: the choice between faithfulness and survival. . . . 
. . . . 
. . . Mormons understand their church to exist in the world to do God’s work, and the 
church clearly cannot do God’s work unless it exists in the world. For Mormons, then, there 
is religious integrity even in compromise and survival. 
Frederick Mark Gedicks, The Integrity of Survival: A Mormon Response to Stanley Hauerwas, 
42 DePaul L. Rev. 167, 171–72 (1992). 
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competing narrative traditions that often underlies religious liberty 
cases.49 
C. Nomination Testimony 
The Senate confirmed Judge Ginsburg’s nomination to the Supreme 
Court by a vote of 96–3 on August 3, 1993.50 As the vote suggests, the 
confirmation hearings were relatively uneventful and uncontroversial. 
But they coincided with an unprecedented crisis engulfing the Court’s 
approach to religious liberty. Three years earlier, the Court had reshaped 
its free exercise jurisprudence with its landmark decision in Employment 
Division v. Smith.51 Smith announced that claims brought under the Free 
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment would receive only the barest of 
constitutional protection from “neutral law[s] of general applicability.”52 
The holding effectively shifted the constitutional analysis of laws 
burdening free exercise claims from strict scrutiny to rational basis 
scrutiny.53 Smith set off a firestorm and drew fierce reactions from around 
the political sphere. On March 11, 1993, Howard McKeon of California 
and Dean Gallo of New Jersey introduced a bill in the House of 
Representatives that would have reversed the effect of Smith by 
stipulating a return to strict scrutiny.54 Eight months later—and three 
months after the Senate confirmed Justice Ginsburg’s nomination—
Congress enacted a version of the McKeon and Gallo bill, the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (“RFRA”).55 
The crafting of RFRA over the summer of 1993 meant that tensions 
between Congress and the Supreme Court over religious liberty emerged 
around the time of Ginsburg’s confirmation process. These tensions were 
amplified by three religion decisions released in close proximity to 
President Clinton’s nomination of Judge Ginsburg to fill the seat vacated 
by Justice Byron White. On June 7, 1993, the Court issued its decision in 
Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District, holding 
that the use of public school facilities for after-school religious 
 
 49. See Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term—Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 
97 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 60–68 (1983). 
 50. Joan Biskupic, Senate, 96–3, Approves Ginsburg as 107th Supreme Court Justice, Wash. Post, 
Aug. 4, 1993, at A4. 
 51. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 52. Id. at 879 (citing United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring)). 
 53. See id. at 885 (“To make an individual’s obligation to obey such a law contingent upon the 
law’s coincidence with his religious beliefs, except where the State’s interest is ‘compelling’—
permitting him, by virtue of his beliefs, ‘to become a law unto himself,’ contradicts both constitutional 
tradition and common sense.” (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1879))). 
 54. H.R. Res. 1308, 103d Cong. (1993) (enacted). 
 55. Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb-4 
(2010)). 
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instruction posed no Establishment Clause concerns.56 Four days later, 
the Court announced its opinion in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. 
City of Hialeah, which clarified that strict scrutiny would continue to 
apply post-Smith when a regulation appeared to single out free exercise 
for hostile treatment.57 The following week—three days after Justice 
Ginsburg’s nomination—the Court announced its decision in Zobrest v. 
Catalina Foothills School District, a 5–4 ruling that required an Arizona 
school district to pay for a sign-language interpreter for a deaf student 
attending a religious high school.58 Lamb’s Chapel, Lukumi Babalu, and 
Zobrest raised some of the core issues of contemporary religious liberty 
claims: use of public facilities by religious groups, express or implied 
animus toward religion, and governmental subsidy of religious practice. 
The decisions were generally heralded as victories for religious liberty 
that reinforced “neutral” or “equal” treatment of religious and 
nonreligious expression. Jim Henderson, an attorney for the conservative 
advocacy group American Center for Law and Justice, even suggested 
that “the [C]ourt has turned a corner on religious freedom and religion in 
public life.”59 Law professor Michael McConnell was more circumspect: 
Church-state jurisprudence “was a muddle before and it’s a muddle 
now.”60 
News coverage drew connections between the recent decisions and 
Justice Ginsburg’s nomination. An article in the Christian Science 
Monitor the week after the nomination quoted law professor Jesse 
Choper as attributing the Court’s ambiguity in religion cases to Justice 
White and suggested that Judge Ginsburg could set a new course as “a 
stronger separationist than White.”61 New York Times reporter Linda 
Greenhouse speculated that “Judge Ginsburg is likely to be substantially 
more liberal than Justice White” on matters pertaining to religion.62 
In light of the ongoing push for RFRA and the Court’s recent 
decisions in Lamb’s Chapel, Lukumi Babalu, and Zobrest, Judge 
Ginsburg’s views about religion cases seemed particularly relevant. In 
response to a question from Senator Patrick Leahy during her testimony 
to the Senate Judiciary Committee, she emphasized that “[o]ur tradition 
 
 56. 508 U.S. 384, 395 (1993). 
 57. 508 U.S. 520, 546 (1993) (“A law burdening religious practice that is not neutral or not of 
general application must undergo the most rigorous of scrutiny.”). 
 58. 509 U.S. 1 (1993). 
 59. Max Boot, Supreme Court Extends Scope of Religious Rights, Christian Sci. Monitor, June 
21, 1993, at 6 (quoting Jim Henderson, Am. Ctr. for Law and Justice). 
 60. Id. (quoting Professor Michael McConnell). 
 61. Id. (quoting Professor Jesse Choper). 
 62. Linda Greenhouse, Overview of the Term; The Court’s Counterrevolution Comes in Fits and 
Starts, N.Y. Times, July 4, 1993, at E1. 
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has been one of many religions, one of tolerance and mutual respect.”63 
When Senator Leahy pressed her about possible tensions between the 
Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses, Judge Ginsburg responded 
with a favorable characterization of the Court’s recent Lamb’s Chapel 
opinion: 
Some crossovers do not create intractable problems, as the Supreme 
Court indicated fairly recently. For example, suppose a school facility 
is available after hours. Can the school board say we are not going to 
allow a religious group to use the facilities, because we don’t want the 
State to be acknowledging religion in any way? The Supreme Court 
said if the facility is open on a first-come, first served basis to anyone, 
the school’s authorities can’t exclude a group on the ground of religion. 
That position does not involve the State in establishing religion. 
Instead, it allows room for people freely to exercise their religion, as 
long as they are not being treated differently from any other group.64 
In its report accompanying its unanimous endorsement of Judge 
Ginsburg’s nomination, the Senate Judiciary Committee praised her 
“understanding of the values of religious pluralism and tolerance” and 
“her approval of the idea that government must accommodate religious 
practice in the absence of ‘special circumstances’—an idea directly in 
conflict with the Smith analysis.”65 Assessing Judge Ginsburg’s testimony 
and her Leahy and Goldman opinions, the Committee concluded that 
Judge Ginsburg “shows sensitivity to the problem at the core of Smith 
and of modern free exercise clause doctrine—the problem of adjusting 
government action on religious practice in a pluralistic society.”66 
D. Justice Ginsburg 
The first religious liberty case that Justice Ginsburg confronted on the 
Supreme Court was Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School 
District v. Grumet.67 The case involved an Establishment Clause challenge 
to the creation of a school district to facilitate the educational needs of 
disabled children of Satmar Jews.68 The majority rejected the school 
district on the grounds that it manifested unconstitutional aid to 
religion.69 Justice Ginsburg joined Justice Stevens’ concurrence, which 
contended that the school district “affirmatively supports a religious 
 
 63. Hearings, supra note 32, at 182; see id. at 212 (“I appreciate that the United States is a country 
of many religions. We have a pluralistic society, and that is characteristic of the United States.”). 
 64. Id. at 180. 
 65. S. Rep. No. 103-6, at 27 (1993). 
 66. Id. at 28. 
 67. 512 U.S. 687 (1994). The discussion of Justice Ginsburg’s votes on the Supreme Court is an 
illustrative rather than exhaustive consideration of the Free Exercise and Establishment Clause cases 
that have come before the Court during her tenure. 
 68. Id. at 692.  
 69. Id. at 690. 
Inazu_63-HLJ-1213 (Do Not Delete) 6/24/2012 8:30 PM 
June 2012] GINSBURG AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 1225 
 
sect’s interest in segregating itself and preventing its children from 
associating with their neighbors” and “increased the likelihood that they 
would remain within the fold.”70 
The following term, Justice Ginsburg joined Justice Souter’s dissent 
in Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia.71 The 
case bears many factual similarities to Martinez. A religious student 
group challenged the university’s denial of funding available to other 
student groups through a student activities fund.72 Justice Kennedy (who 
would prove to be the crucial fifth vote in Martinez) authored the 
majority opinion concluding that the denial of funding amounted to 
viewpoint discrimination in a limited public forum and that the funding 
of the religious student group would not violate the Establishment 
Clause.73 Justice Souter’s dissent rejected Justice Kennedy’s Establishment 
Clause analysis and argued that the Court had abandoned its role of 
ensuring that direct aid flowed only to secular activities and not sectarian 
ones.74 
Six years after Rosenberger, the Court revisited the relationship 
between religious expression, government funding, and the public forum, 
in Good News Club v. Milford Central School.75 The case involved a public 
school’s denial of after-hours meeting space to a Christian children’s club 
even though the space was generally available to other private groups.76 
Justice Thomas’s majority opinion relied on Rosenberger and Lamb’s 
Chapel to strike down the denial of meeting space as viewpoint 
discrimination.77 As in Rosenberger, the Court found no Establishment 
Clause concerns.78 Justice Ginsburg again joined Justice Souter’s 
dissent.79 
Justice Ginsburg’s most substantial opinion in a free exercise case 
came in Cutter v. Wilkinson,80 which involved a challenge brought under 
the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 
(“RLUIPA”).81 The case arose when prisoners incarcerated at an Ohio 
 
 70. Id. at 711 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 71. 515 U.S. 819 (1995). 
 72. Id. at 822–23. 
 73. Id. at 831, 846. 
 74. Id. at 873–74 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 75. 533 U.S. 98 (2001). 
 76. Id. at 102. 
 77.  Id. at 107. 
 78. Id. at 112. 
 79. Id. at 134 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter argued that the school’s policy was viewpoint 
neutral because it prohibited the use of school facilities for religious purposes, rather than prohibiting 
use by groups with a religious viewpoint, as in Lamb’s Chapel. Id. at 136–39. 
 80. 544 U.S. 709 (2005). 
 81. Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803 (2000) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc–2000cc-5 
(2010)). 
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corrections center alleged that they were being prevented from practicing 
nonmainstream religions, including Wicca and Satanism.82 The 
corrections center countered that accommodating these religions would 
violate the Establishment Clause.83 Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion 
held that RLUIPA “does not, on its face, exceed the limits of permissible 
government accommodation of religious practices.”84 She quoted 
language from Smith emphasizing that the “exercise of religion often 
involves not only belief and profession but [also] the performance 
of . . . physical acts [such as] assembling with others for a worship service 
[or] participating in sacramental use of bread and wine.”85 
II.  Government Funding of Speech 
A second strand of Justice Ginsburg’s jurisprudence relevant to this 
Article concerns government funding of speech. The complicated 
relationship between funding and speech that has emerged in the case 
law is affected by two related doctrines: the doctrine of unconstitutional 
conditions and the doctrine of government speech. The basic premise of 
the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is that denying a generally 
available governmental benefit (such as funding) is considered a penalty 
for purposes of constitutional analysis.86 The basic premise of the 
government speech doctrine is that the government may take steps (such 
as selective funding) to convey its own message.87 It is not hard to see 
why these divergent premises are likely to cause confusion. The Supreme 
Court, in an opinion joined by Justice Ginsburg, has acknowledged as 
much: 
Neither the latitude for government speech nor its rationale applies to 
subsidies for private speech in every instance, however. As we have 
 
 82. Cutter, 544 U.S. at 712. 
 83. Id. at 713. 
 84. Id. at 714. 
 85. Id. at 720 (alterations in original) (quoting Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990)). 
 86. See Robert C. Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 Yale L.J. 151, 155 (1996); Kathleen M. Sullivan, 
Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 1413, 1415 (1989); see also Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 
173, 192–93 (1991) (holding that the failure to fund is not an unconstitutional burden); Harris v. 
McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 326 (1980) (same). 
 87.  Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995) (“When the 
government disburses public funds to private entities to convey a governmental message, it may take 
legitimate and appropriate steps to ensure that its message is neither garbled nor distorted by the 
grantee.”); see Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550 (2005). Justice Scalia’s majority opinion 
in Johanns concluded that generic advertising funded by a targeted assessment on beef producers was 
not susceptible to a First Amendment compelled-subsidy challenge. Id. at 562. Justice Ginsburg 
concurred in the judgment on the grounds that the assessment was a permissible government 
regulation, but wrote separately to explain why she did not view this as a government speech case. Id. 
at 569–70 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (arguing that the government did not use its name in the beef 
advertising, and in fact affirmatively recommended against overconsumption of beef in its various 
dietary guidelines). 
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pointed out, “[i]t does not follow . . . that viewpoint-based restrictions 
are proper when the [government] does not itself speak or subsidize 
transmittal of a message it favors but instead expends funds to 
encourage a diversity of views from private speakers.”88 
The preceding language highlights the tension between government 
speech and unconstitutional conditions. But it leaves open important 
questions of how we ascertain the government’s motive and how we 
assess what constitutes viewpoint discrimination. 
Justice Ginsburg’s most explicit views about this area of the law are 
found in a partial dissent that she authored while on the D.C. Circuit in 
DKT Memorial Fund v. Agency for International Development.89 DKT is 
not a religion case, but it raises questions about funding and associational 
freedom that bear upon many religious liberty cases, including Martinez. 
DKT involved statutory and constitutional challenges to restrictions 
on abortion funding implemented by the executive branch pursuant to 
the Foreign Assistance Act.90 The Act authorized funding for “voluntary 
population planning,”91 but prohibited the use of any funds for 
“abortions or involuntary sterilization as a means of family planning.”92 
The Agency for International Development (“AID”), in accordance with 
delegated statutory authority, implemented a requirement that domestic 
and foreign nongovernmental organizations certify that they would not 
“perform[] or actively promote[] abortion as a method of family planning 
in AID-recipient countries or . . . provide[] financial support to any other 
foreign nongovernmental organization that conducts such activities.”93 A 
consortium of nongovernmental organizations including DKT Memorial 
Fund asserted that AID’s policy violated  
First Amendment rights by rendering plaintiffs ineligible to receive 
population assistance funds because they engage in certain activities 
relating to voluntary abortion, including the dissemination of 
information, that run afoul of AID’s policy, and by rendering plaintiffs 
unable to associate in AID programs with persons or entities whose 
abortion-related activities, including the dissemination of information, 
conflict with AID’s policy.94 
Judge Sentelle’s opinion for the court addressed DKT’s free speech 
and expressive association arguments. Turning first to the speech claim, 
he began by insisting that the plaintiffs had mischaracterized as 
 
 88. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 542 (2001) (alterations in original) (quoting 
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 834). 
 89. 887 F.2d 275 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
 90. Id. at 277. 
 91. Id. (quoting 22 U.S.C. § 2151b(b) (1961)). 
 92. Id. (quoting 22 U.S.C. § 2151b(f)(3) (1961)). 
 93. Id. at 278. 
 94. Id. at 282. 
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viewpoint discrimination what was actually just “a refusal to fund.”95 
According to Sentelle, it was “settled law” that “[t]he fact that the 
government subsidizes one constitutionally protected or constitutionally 
permissible activity is no reason that it has to subsidize another.”96 AID’s 
policy “simply represents an election to fund some communicative and 
associational acts, while not funding all.”97 
Sentelle turned next to the expressive association claim. He rejected 
DKT’s argument that AID’s hindrance of a joint project between DKT 
and another nonprofit “involving much conduct and some expression” 
violated DKT’s right of expressive association.98 Instead, “the refusal to 
subsidize the exercise of a constitutionally protected right is not 
tantamount to an infringement of that right.”99  
Sentelle concluded his freedom of association analysis by discussing 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Grove City College v. Bell.100 In that 
decision, the Court had rejected a freedom of association claim brought 
by a Christian college denied federal money because it refused as a 
matter of conscience to sign a Title IX compliance document from the 
Department of Education.101 Sentelle reasoned that if the Department of 
Education could deny funding to Grove City College, then AID could 
deny funding to DKT. 
Judge Ginsburg filed a vigorous partial dissent.102 In her view, Grove 
City College was inapposite because “abortion (or anti-abortion) 
counseling is speech sheltered by the first amendment, while 
 
 95. Id. at 287. 
 96. Id. at 288. 
 97. Id. at 289. 
 98. Id. at 292. 
 99. Id. at 293 (citing, inter alia, Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540 
(1983)). 
 100. Id. at 294; see Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984). 
 101. Grove City Coll., 465 U.S. at 559–60. The compliance document prohibited “discrimination 
under any education program or activity for which [the school] receives or benefits from Federal 
financial assistance.” Id. at 560–61. The college made clear that “discrimination on the basis of race or 
sex is morally repugnant to its principles,” see Brief for Petitioners, Grove City Coll., 465 U.S. 555 (No. 
82-792), 1983 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 292, at *9, and there was no indication that it had ever 
discriminated on these grounds, see Grove City Coll., 465 U.S. at 577 (Powell, J., concurring). It argued 
that the application of the Title IX restrictions violated its “First Amendment rights to academic 
freedom and association.” Brief for Petitioners, supra, at *80. Just two weeks before the college filed 
its brief, the Supreme Court rebuffed a freedom of association argument from another Christian 
college in a case that pitted religious group autonomy against antidiscrimination norms. See Bob Jones 
Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983). Finding that Grove City College’s freedom of association 
argument “warrant[ed] only brief consideration,” the Court tersely concluded that Title IX restrictions 
trumped the college’s First Amendment rights: “Congress is free to attach reasonable and 
unambiguous conditions to federal financial assistance that education institutions are not obligated to 
accept.” Grove City Coll., 465 U.S. at 575 (majority opinion).  
 102. Judge Ginsburg concurred in the court’s rejection of DKT’s statutory claims. DKT, 887 F.2d 
at 299 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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discriminating adversely on the basis of race, national origin, religion or 
sex is not one’s constitutional right.”103 She rejected the majority’s claim 
that DKT was simply a funding case, insisting that “DKT’s case rests on 
the freedom to communicate, to receive communications, and to maintain 
associations.”104 She warned that the government was attempting to 
“manipulate[] out of existence guaranties [of freedom of speech and 
association] embedded in the Constitution of the United States,”105 and 
concluded her opinion by asserting that “[t]he handicap our government 
has placed on DKT’s speech and associations is repugnant to the first 
amendment.”106 Judge Ginsburg’s DKT dissent thus advocated robust 
protections for freedom of speech and association107 and resisted funding 
constraints that inhibit “speech sheltered by the first amendment.”108 Her 
core objection was rooted in the doctrine of unconstitutional 
conditions.109 
Judge Ginsburg reinforced the beliefs she expressed in her DKT 
dissent during her testimony to the Senate Judiciary Committee during 
her nomination process. In discussing her views on free speech, she 
expressed three core ideas: (1) freedom of expression extends to 
expression that we hate,110 (2) even nonverbal acts can express ideas,111 
and (3) “taxing and spending decisions . . . can seriously interfere with 
the exercise of constitutional freedoms.”112 As Martinez illustrates, each 
 
 103. Id. at 301 n.2 (citation omitted). Turning to AID’s policy, Ginsburg emphasized that 
“[t]hrough AID, ‘the United States continues to be the largest single donor of international population 
assistance, contributing more than 40 percent of the total $500 million provided by all donors in 
1986.’” Id. at 302 (quoting Declaration of John J. Dumm, Deputy Dir. of the Office of Population of 
AID, Dec. 30, 1987, at 5). 
 104. Id. at 303. 
 105. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. R.R. Comm’n, 271 U.S. 
583, 594 (1926)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 106. Id. at 308. 
 107. Id. at 303.  
 108. Id. at 301 n.2. 
 109. Id. at 301 (citing Sullivan, supra note 86). Justice Ginsburg also made an unconstitutional 
conditions argument in an amicus brief she filed in a case challenging mandatory periods of maternity 
leave for public school teachers who became pregnant. See Brief of Amici Curiae ACLU et al., 
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. La Fleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1973) (No. 72-777), 1973 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 
11, at *49 (“While it is true that [a teacher] does not have a constitutional right to continue public 
employment, it cannot be gainsaid that she does have a right to be free from the imposition of 
unconstitutional conditions in connection with that employment.” (alteration in original) (quoting 
Buckley v. Coyle Pub. Sch. Sys., 476 F.2d 92, 96–97 (10th Cir. 1973))). 
 110. Responding to a question from Senator Leahy, Judge Ginsburg emphasized that “free speech 
means not freedom of thought and speech for those with whom we agree, but freedom of expression 
for the expression we hate.” Hearings, supra note 32, at 313. 
 111. Id. at 226 (“It is said that during World War II the King of Denmark stepped out on the street 
in Copenhagen wearing a yellow armband. If so, that gesture expressed the idea more forcefully than 
words could.”). 
 112. FEC v. Int’l Funding Inst., 969 F.2d 1110, 1118 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) 
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of these ideas is also central to any meaningful protections for religious 
expression and practice. 
III.  Equality 
The final dimension of Justice Ginsburg’s jurisprudence that 
influences her views about religious liberty generally and Martinez in 
particular is her emphasis on “equal dignity,” which Professor Neil Siegel 
has called the “central purpose” of her constitutional vision.113 He 
suggests that “[d]uring her Supreme Court confirmation hearing, then-
Judge Ginsburg put the Senate and the public on notice of the core 
content of her constitutional vision.”114 As Siegel elaborates, Ginsburg 
underscored for the Senators who would be voting on her 
confirmation . . . . her belief that the meaning of the Constitution 
changes over time, as each generation of Americans seeks to perfect 
constitutional ideals that were originally articulated by the Founders. 
They perfect these ideals in part by broadening the universe of 
beneficiaries—for example, by according women the respect and 
opportunities they are due as full-fledged members of the political 
community.115 
Siegel’s assessment of Justice Ginsburg’s “constitutional core” has 
been borne out in her tenure on the Supreme Court. She shares this core 
vision with at least two other recent Justices—Sandra Day O’Connor and 
John Paul Stevens.116 But the core concerns of these three Justices also 
raise important questions as to what constitutes “the political 
community” and the extent to which the state should regulate 
nongovernmental actors with the coercive force of law to ensure “respect 
and opportunities” for the members of that community. These questions 
are particularly important in religious liberty cases, which introduce 
competing “counter-assimilationist” ideals that allow people “of 
different religious faiths to maintain their differences in the face of 
powerful pressures to conform.”117 Justice Ginsburg implicitly recognized 
these counter-assimilationist values in the support she showed for 
 
(emphasis removed). Senator Patrick Leahy quoted this language while seeking clarification of an 
earlier statement by Judge Ginsburg. Hearings, supra note 32, at 184. Judge Ginsburg indicated that 
she continued to adhere to the view she expressed in that case. Id. (“I said yesterday that the 
Government can buy Shakespeare and not modern theater. . . . [W]hat the Government cannot do is 
buy Republican speech and not Democratic speech, buy white speech and not black speech . . . .”). 
 113. Neil S. Siegel, “Equal Citizenship Stature”: Justice Ginsburg’s Constitutional Vision, 43 New 
Eng. L. Rev. 799, 816 (2009). 
 114. Id. at 814. 
 115. Id. at 815 (footnote omitted). 
 116. See Gregory P. Magarian, Justice Stevens, Religion, and Civil Society, 2011 Wisc. L. Rev. 733, 
746 (noting the “central concern with equal citizenship” of both Justice O’Connor and Justice Stevens). 
 117. Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
1109, 1139 (1990). 
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Simcha Goldman’s wearing of a yarmulke.118 But not every religious 
liberty case reconciles with her constitutional core as easily as 
Goldman—many of the more difficult cases require a more direct 
weighing of constitutional values. 
The tension between religious liberty and Justice Ginsburg’s 
equality commitments is particularly evident in the area of gay rights. We 
can glean some insights into her views about gay rights from two key 
cases decided during her time on the Court: Romer v. Evans119 and 
Lawrence v. Texas.120 In Romer, the Court overturned a voter-approved 
amendment to Colorado’s constitution that would have prohibited state 
or local government from passing antidiscrimination laws protecting gays 
and lesbians.121 In Lawrence, the Court invalidated a Texas law 
criminalizing same-sex sodomy, overruling its earlier decision in Bowers 
v. Hardwick.122 Justice Ginsburg joined the majority in both opinions. 
Justice Ginsburg also dissented in an important decision that went 
against gay rights, Boy Scouts of America v. Dale.123 Dale involved the 
clash between antidiscrimination law and the freedom of association of a 
private noncommercial group. The Court sided with the Boy Scouts in 
their decision to exclude a gay scoutmaster from their membership.124 
Although Dale was a setback for gay rights, it adopted the precarious 
“expressive association” framework first announced in Roberts v. United 
States Jaycees.125 I have argued elsewhere that this framework offers little 
meaningful protection for private groups that resist antidiscrimination 
norms.126 Indeed, absent a change in the Court’s approach to expressive 
 
 118. Goldman v. Sec’y of Def., 739 F.2d 657, 660 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). 
 119. 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 120. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). Julie Nice observes that Martinez reflects the current “moment in time 
regarding society’s consideration of gay rights,” which grew out of Romer and Lawrence. Julie Nice, 
How Equality Constitutes Liberty: The Alignment of CLS v. Martinez, 38 Hastings Const. L.Q. 631, 
645 (2011). 
 121. 517 U.S. at 623. 
 122. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)). 
 123. 530 U.S. 640 (2000). Justice Ginsburg also joined the unanimous opinion in Hurley v. Irish-
American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston, in which the Court held that requiring private 
parade organizers to allow the participation of an LGBT group would alter the expressive content of the 
parade and therefore violate the First Amendment rights of the organizers. 515 U.S. 557, 559 (1995). 
 124. Dale, 530 U.S. at 659. 
 125. Id. at 648 (quoting Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984)). The Court in Roberts 
recognized a distinction between freedom of intimate association and freedom of expressive 
association. Intimate association “receives protection as a fundamental element of personal liberty.” 
Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617–18 (1984). Expressive association, “a right to associate for 
the purpose of engaging in those activities protected by the First Amendment—speech, assembly, 
petition . . . and the exercise of religion,” receives protection only “as an indispensable means of 
preserving other individual liberties.” Id. at 618 (emphasis added). 
 126. See Inazu, The Unsettling “Well-Settled” Law, supra note 4, at 181–97 (illustrating the 
weaknesses of the expressive association doctrine). 
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association, it may only be a matter of time before Dale is overruled. The 
key gay rights cases leading up to Martinez are Romer and Lawrence, not 
Dale. 
IV.  CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOCIETY V. MARTINEZ 
The preceding sections have traced Justice Ginsburg’s views on 
religion, government funding of expression, and equality (particularly in 
the area of gay rights). These areas converged in Martinez. The litigation 
leading up to Martinez began in 2004, when the Christian Legal Society 
(“CLS”) chapter at the University of California, Hastings College of the 
Law in San Francisco sought to become a recognized student 
organization.127 Hastings typically granted “official recognition” to private 
student groups, making clear that it “neither sponsor[ed] nor endorse[d]” 
the views of those groups and insisting that they inform third parties that 
they were not sponsored by the law school.128 
Hastings officials withheld recognition from CLS because the 
group’s Statement of Faith violated the religion and sexual orientation 
provisions of the school’s Nondiscrimination Policy.129 As a result, the 
school denied CLS travel funds and funding from student activity fees.130 
It also denied them the use of the school’s logo, use of a Hastings email 
address, the opportunity to send mass emails to the student body, 
participation in the annual student organizations fair, and the ability to 
reserve meeting spaces on campus.131 Hastings subsequently asserted that 
its denial of recognition stemmed from an “accept-all-comers” policy that 
required student organizations to accept any student who desired to be a 
member of the organization.132 
CLS filed suit in federal district court asserting violations of 
expressive association, free speech, free exercise of religion, and equal 
protection.133 The court granted Hastings’ motion for summary 
 
 127. Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2980 (2010). 
 128. Brief for Petitioner at 4, Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (No. 08-1371) [hereinafter CLS Brief]. 
 129. Id. at 9. 
 130. Id. at 10. 
 131. Christian Legal Soc’y v. Kane, No. C 04-04484, 2006 WL 997217, at *17 (N.D. Cal. May 19, 
2006); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 10, Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (No. 08-1371). 
 132. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2978. 
 133. Kane, 2006 WL 997217, at *4. 
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judgment.134 CLS appealed the district court’s decision to the Ninth 
Circuit, which affirmed the district court.135 
After granting certiorari, a divided Supreme Court rejected CLS’s 
challenge.136 Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion concluded that Hastings’ 
all-comers policy was “a reasonable, viewpoint-neutral condition on 
access to the student-organization forum.”137 The following pages assess 
her opinion in the areas of religion, government funding of speech, and 
equality. 
A. Religion 
Martinez involved a Christian student group that ascribed to a 
theological creed and met regularly for Bible study and prayer.138 Justice 
Ginsburg dismissed CLS’s free exercise claim in a footnote.139 Of course, 
she is not wholly to blame—the conclusion flows almost inevitably from 
Employment Division v. Smith.140 But Martinez obscures the values of 
religious association—values upon which religious groups had 
increasingly relied in the wake of Smith.141 
 
 134. Id. at *1. The district court granted leave for a group called Hastings Outlaw to intervene in 
the case. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 131, at 10. Outlaw asserted that its members had a 
right to be officers and voting members in any other campus group (including CLS) and that its 
members opposed their student activity fees funding an organization that they found offensive. Id. at 
10–11. 
 135. Christian Legal Soc’y v. Kane, 319 F. App’x 645, 645–46 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Truth v. Kent 
Sch. Dist., 542 F.3d 634, 649–50 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that the school district could deny recognition 
to a high school Bible club that limited its voting members and officers to those who shared the 
group’s beliefs)). 
 136. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2978. 
 137. Id. at 2978. Justice Alito authored a dissent joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices 
Thomas and Scalia. Id. at 3000 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 138. See CLS Brief, supra note 128, at 5 (“The national Christian Legal Society maintains attorney 
and law student chapters across the country. Student chapters, such as that at Hastings, invite speakers 
to give public lectures addressing how to integrate Christian faith with legal practice, organize 
transportation to worship services, and host occasional dinners. The signature activities of the chapters 
are weekly Bible studies, which, in addition to discussion of the text, usually include prayer and other 
forms of worship. . . . [T]o be officers or voting members of CLS—and to lead its Bible studies—
students must affirm their commitment to the group’s core beliefs by signing the national CLS 
Statement of Faith and pledging to live their lives accordingly.” (citations omitted)); see also id. at 6 
(quoting CLS’s Statement of Faith). 
 139. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2995 n.27 (“CLS briefly argues that Hastings’ all-comers condition 
violates the Free Exercise Clause. Our decision in Smith forecloses that argument. In Smith, the Court 
held that the Free Exercise Clause does not inhibit enforcement of otherwise valid regulations of 
general application that incidentally burden religious conduct. In seeking an exemption from Hastings’ 
across-the-board all-comers policy, CLS, we repeat, seeks preferential, not equal, treatment; it 
therefore cannot moor its request for accommodation to the Free Exercise Clause.” (citations 
omitted)). 
 140. See 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 141. See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 112 (2001) (concluding that a 
school’s exclusion of a Christian group from school premises was “impermissible viewpoint 
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Justice Ginsburg concluded that CLS’s speech and association 
claims “merged,” which allowed her to resolve the dispute entirely within 
a free speech limited-public-forum analysis.142 This merging of CLS’s 
speech and association claims reflects a worrisome trend that fails to 
make meaningful distinctions between the various rights protected under 
the First Amendment.143 It misses the expressiveness inherent in almost 
any act of associating, and in this way obscures religious liberty claims 
that are tied to associational freedom. 
Justice Ginsburg insisted that “CLS’s conduct—not its Christian 
perspective—is, from Hastings’ vantage point, what stands between the 
group and RSO [registered student organization] status.”144 But CLS’s 
“conduct” is inseparable from its message.145 Justice Ginsburg’s opinion 
misses this connection. Quoting from CLS’s brief, she wrote that 
“expressive association in this case is ‘the functional equivalent of speech 
itself’”146 to set up the idea that expressive association is entitled to no 
more constitutional protection than speech. But CLS had asserted: 
[W]here one of the central purposes of a noncommercial expressive 
association is the communication of a moral teaching, its choice of who 
will formulate and articulate that message is treated as the functional 
equivalent of speech itself.147 
CLS was not arguing that association is nothing more than speech 
but that association is itself a form of expression—whom it selects as its 
members and leaders communicates a message. CLS underscored this 
point elsewhere in its brief, arguing that “[b]ecause a group’s leaders 
define and shape the group’s message, the right to select leaders is an 
 
discrimination”); see also Alan Brownstein & Vikram Amar, Reviewing Associational Freedom Claims 
in a Limited Public Forum: An Extension of the Distinction Between Debate-Dampening and Debate-
Distorting State Action, 38 Hastings Const. L.Q. 505, 540 (2011). The Court’s recent Hosanna Tabor 
decision renews the focus on religious association. See supra note 5. 
 142. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2985. 
 143. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269–70 (1981). While Widmar was the first case to 
resolve a free exercise claim explicitly through the rights of speech and association, the Court had 
previously engaged in similar reasoning. See, e.g., W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 
634–35 (1943). For an academic argument on these grounds, see Mark Tushnet, The Redundant Free 
Exercise Clause?, 33 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 71, 94 (2001) (“The free speech doctrine and the newly defined 
right of expressive association go a long way to providing an adequate substitute for the Free Exercise 
Clause.”). As Steven Smith has observed, “[p]roposals to collapse the commitment to religious 
freedom into other values such as freedom of speech, freedom of association, and equal protection 
have proliferated.” Steven D. Smith, The Rise and Fall of Religious Freedom in Constitutional 
Discourse, 140 U. Pa. L. Rev. 149, 239 n.363 (1991). 
 144. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2994. 
 145. The Supreme Court occasionally evades this distinction. See, e.g., Rumsfeld v. Forum for 
Academic & Inst’l Rights, 547 U.S. 47, 66 (2006) (“[W]e have extended First Amendment protection 
only to conduct that is inherently expressive.”). 
 146. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2985 (quoting CLS Brief, supra note 128, at 35). 
 147. CLS Brief, supra note 128, at 35. 
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essential element of its right to speak.”148 Justice Ginsburg interpreted 
this assertion to mean that “CLS suggests that its expressive-association 
claim plays a part auxiliary to speech’s starring role.”149 That 
interpretation may be consistent with the understanding of expressive 
association that has emerged in cases like Dale,150 but it misses the 
fundamental connection between a group’s message and its composition. 
Justice Ginsburg’s inattention to religious liberty is also evident in 
her rejection of CLS’s distinction between gay “conduct” and the 
“status” of being gay.151 CLS insisted that it welcomed members who 
were gay but precluded gay or straight students who condoned or 
engaged in gay sex.152 CLS also denied membership to students who 
condoned or engaged in heterosexual sex outside of marriage.153 The 
distinction between status and conduct is a familiar one in the law.154 It is 
also rooted in Christian tradition, and in that context it is not limited to 
homosexuality—according to most Christian traditions, one can be a 
sinner and abstain from a particular sin; one can desire to eat an apple and 
 
 148. Id. at 18. 
 149. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2985 (citing CLS Brief, supra note 128, at 18). 
 150. See supra notes 124–25 and accompanying text. 
 151. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2990.  
 152. CLS Brief, supra note 128, at 5. 
 153. See Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 3001 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“In early 2004, the national 
organization adopted a resolution stating that ‘[i]n view of the clear dictates of Scripture, unrepentant 
participation in or advocacy of a sexually immoral lifestyle is inconsistent with an affirmation of the 
Statement of Faith, and consequently may be regarded by CLS as disqualifying such an individual 
from CLS membership.’” (alteration in original)). 
 154. See, e.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 665–67 (1962) (distinguishing between the 
status of narcotic addiction and the crime of illegal drug use); see also Eugene Volokh, Freedom of 
Expressive Association and Government Subsidies, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 1919, 1938 (2006) (“[A] religious 
group (say, a Catholic group) that condemns homosexuality might demand that its members share 
those views. Such a demand would be neither religious discrimination nor sexual orientation 
discrimination, but only discrimination based on holding a certain viewpoint that secular people could 
hold as well as religious ones. But such a group rule wouldn’t just exclude practicing homosexuals, or 
at least those practicing homosexuals who believe that homosexuality is proper—it would also exclude 
heterosexual Catholics who disagree with church teachings on this issue.”); cf. Powell v. Texas, 
392 U.S. 514, 532 (1968) (“On its face the present case does not fall within [the holding of Robinson], 
since appellant was convicted, not for being a chronic alcoholic, but for being in public while drunk on 
a particular occasion. The State of Texas thus has not sought to punish a mere status, as California did 
in Robinson . . . .”); Christian Legal Soc’y v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853, 860 (7th Cir. 2006) (“CLS’s 
membership policies are . . . based on belief and behavior rather than status . . . .”); Lofton v. Sec’y of 
the Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 827 (11th Cir. 2004) (“Whereas [the state 
constitutional amendment at issue in Romer v. Evans] encompassed both conduct and status, Florida’s 
adoption prohibition is limited to conduct.” (citations omitted)); United States v. Black, 116 F.3d 198, 
201 (7th Cir. 1997) (“Black maintains that he has been convicted based on his status as a pedophile or 
ephebophile. However, the indictment does not criminalize him in that capacity but simply charges 
him for his conduct of receiving, possessing and distributing child pornography that traveled in 
interstate commerce.”). 
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not eat an apple; one can be gay (or straight) and be celibate.155 One of the 
amicus briefs in Martinez emphasized this distinction to the Court.156 
As Kenji Yoshino has observed, the relationship between status and 
conduct is also closely tied to gay identity.157 According to Yoshino, 
performance (or conduct) is sometimes constitutive of identity.158 He 
elaborates: 
Gay status can at times be experienced as existing independently of 
homosexual sodomy, as perhaps most clearly seen in the instance of 
celibate individuals who nonetheless conceive of themselves as gay. 
But gay status can at other times be experienced as constituted by 
homosexual sodomy, as perhaps most clearly seen in the instance of 
the individual whose homosexual experience leads him to embrace a 
gay identity.159 
Yoshino’s description is highly plausible as a sociological or 
experiential claim. But its translation into a constitutional norm is less 
clear. For Yoshino—whose larger project critiques legal regimes that 
encourage a “covering” or hiding of gay conduct—the question is 
“whether a commitment against status discrimination might require us to 
prohibit discrimination against an act [sometimes] constitutive of that 
status.”160 I think Yoshino is mostly right here, but the bracketed qualifier 
that I have added to his question is critical to the constitutional analysis. 
If conduct were a necessary condition of status, then discrimination 
against conduct would be discrimination against status. But that is not 
Yoshino’s argument—he is making the weaker claim that conduct is 
sometimes constitutive of status. The weaker claim also has an important 
corollary: Inaction is also a kind of conduct (or performance) that is 
partially constitutive of status. A virgin maintains that status (and 
identity claim) through inaction. A gay person who chooses not to 
engage in sexual conduct makes an identity claim (cognitively, but also 
performatively) that acknowledges both gayness and some other 
 
 155. See generally Richard B. Hays, The Moral Vision of the New Testament—Community, 
Cross, New Creation, A Contemporary Introduction to New Testament Ethics (1996). The 
distinction between status and conduct advanced by CLS in Martinez should not be confused with 
either the “nurture” versus “nature” arguments raised by some conservative religious believers or with 
certain strands of neo-Thomistic natural law objections to homosexuality. 
 156. See Brief of Amici Curiae Evangelical Scholars, in Support of Petitioner at 9, Martinez, 
130 S. Ct. 2971 (No. 08-1371) (“[A] distinction between inward desires and outward conduct is a 
common one in evangelical thinking and would apply in many areas of moral conduct.”). 
 157. Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 Yale L.J. 769, 778 (2002). 
 158. Id. at 868. Yoshino advances what he calls the “weak performative model” of identity, id. at 
871, which builds upon the work of Judith Butler. See generally Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: 
Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (2d ed. 1999); Judith Butler, Bodies That Matter: On 
the Discursive Limits of “Sex” (1993). 
 159. Yoshino, supra note 157, at 873. 
 160. Id. 
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characteristic that modifies gayness (perhaps placing gayness in a 
subservient role, as with the gay Christian who chooses celibacy).161 
Once we acknowledge that both action and inaction can be 
constitutive of identity, we see why a constitutional pronouncement that 
equates status and conduct (like Justice Ginsburg’s assertion in 
Martinez) overreaches. It may well be that with respect to sexual 
orientation, most gays view conduct as at least partially constitutive of 
identity. If that is the case, it should cause us to question a coercive law 
of the state (like a sodomy restriction) that purports to prohibit only 
conduct and not discriminate against status.162 But this reasoning cannot 
be readily exported to all antidiscrimination laws. A private group that 
insists upon certain conduct (or inaction) as a basis of membership is not 
denying the right of anyone to pursue her performative identity in 
society—the constraint is simply that a person who wishes to be a 
member of the group must prioritize her identity claims in a way 
consistent with the norms of the group. That claim will inevitably 
encounter some limits. For example, if a group provided an essential 
means of access to core social or economic goods, then we might be 
concerned about a kind of de facto state action.163 But CLS at Hastings 
College of the Law is not such a group. 
Given the essentially private nature of CLS, the effects of its 
membership policy, while exclusionary and not without harm, do not 
constrict performative identity. In fact, the membership restriction asks 
its own kind of performance—a performance of celibacy and denial of 
the primacy of sexual identity. In the context of a private group (as 
opposed to the public law at issue in Lawrence), it is difficult to conflate a 
conduct requirement with one directed at status. 
In her Leahy opinion on the D.C. Circuit, Judge Ginsburg took the 
time to explore “[t]he theological roots of Leahy’s asserted belief.”164 Yet 
 
 161. While Yoshino recognizes the possibility of prioritizing other identities over gay identity, he 
implies that gays who do so are “covering.” See id. at 846 (“Gays can cover by prioritizing their other 
identities over their gay identity. Because human beings have many identities, they can cover a 
particular identity with the others. The impetus to cover a stigmatized identity with unstigmatized 
identities will be particularly strong.”). But unless we remove all agency from prioritizing identities, it 
can’t be the case that all instances of subverting gay identity to a different identity (even an identity 
like Christian) are problematic. 
 162. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 583 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“While it is 
true that the law applies only to conduct, the conduct targeted by this law is conduct that is closely 
correlated with being homosexual. Under such circumstances, [the] law is targeted at more than 
conduct. It is instead directed toward gay persons as a class.”). 
 163. Cf. Inazu, Liberty’s Refuge, supra note 4, at 14–16 (“The right of assembly is a presumptive 
right of individuals to form and participate in peaceable, noncommercial groups. This right is rebuttable 
when there is a compelling reason for thinking that the justifications for protecting assembly do not apply 
(as when the group prospers under monopolistic or near-monopolistic conditions).”). 
 164. Leahy v. Dist. of Columbia, 833 F.2d 1046, 1047–48 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
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in Martinez, she swiftly rejected the theological argument, asserting that 
“[o]ur decisions have declined to distinguish between status and 
conduct” in the context of sexual orientation.165 Stare decisis did not 
compel this conclusion; indeed, Justice Ginsburg’s pronouncement was 
widely viewed as a significant development, as evidenced by the 
supplemental brief filed by the plaintiffs in the Proposition 8 litigation 
the day after Martinez was announced.166 
B. Speech and Money 
Justice Ginsburg emphasized that CLS was “seeking what is 
effectively a state subsidy.”167 She claimed that “Hastings, through its 
RSO program, is dangling the carrot of subsidy, not wielding the stick of 
prohibition.”168 But this argument elides the fact that, like the plaintiffs in 
DKT, CLS’s case “rests on the freedom to communicate, to receive 
communications, and to maintain associations.”169 In DKT, then-Judge 
Ginsburg warned that the government’s funding constraint was 
attempting to “manipulate[] out of existence guaranties [of freedom of 
speech and association] embedded in the Constitution of the United 
States.”170 She concluded her opinion by asserting that “[t]he handicap 
our government has placed on DKT’s speech and associations is 
repugnant to the first amendment.”171 
The same principles that led Justice Ginsburg to argue for strong 
associational protections in DKT are at issue in Martinez.172 Indeed, one 
 
 165. Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2990 (2010). Justice Ginsburg relied on two 
authorities for the claim: Lawrence v. Texas and Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic. The key 
language in Lawrence emphasized that “[w]hen homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of the 
State, that declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons to 
discrimination.” 539 U.S. at 575 (majority opinion). The sentence that Justice Ginsburg highlighted 
from Bray asserted that “[a] tax on wearing yarmulkes is a tax on Jews.” 506 U.S. 263, 270 (1993). 
 166. Letter from Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr., Counsel for Plaintiffs in Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 
704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010), to Vaughn R. Walker, Chief Judge, U.S. Dist. Ct. for the N. Dist. 
of Cal. (June 29, 2010), available at http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/california/ 
candce/3:2009cv02292/215270/695/ (“The Court’s holding [in Martinez] arose in response to Christian 
Legal Society’s argument that it was not discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation, but rather 
because gay and lesbian individuals refused to acknowledge that their conduct was morally wrong. The 
Court rejected that argument, holding that there is no distinction between gay and lesbian individuals 
and their conduct.”). 
 167. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2986. 
 168. Id. 
 169. DKT Mem’l Fund Ltd. v. Agency for Int’l Dev., 887 F.2d 275, 303 (D.C. Cir. 1989) 
(Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 170. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. R.R. Comm’n, 271 U.S. 583, 
594 (1926)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 171. Id. at 308. 
 172. Richard A. Epstein, Church and State at the Crossroads: Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, 
2010 Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. 105, 110 (“[B]y ignoring the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, [Ginsburg] 
allowed Hastings far too much discretion in how it treated its student organizations.”). 
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of Justice Ginsburg’s more problematic arguments in her DKT dissent 
was her effort to distinguish Grove City College on the grounds that 
“abortion (or anti-abortion) counseling is speech sheltered by the first 
amendment, while discriminating adversely on the basis of race, national 
origin, religion or sex is not one’s constitutional right.”173 That argument 
misses the reality that “discrimination” and “freedom of association” are 
two sides of the same coin. As Justice Ginsburg herself noted in 
Martinez, “[f]reedom of association, we have recognized, plainly 
presupposes a freedom not to associate,”174 and “[i]nsisting that an 
organization embrace unwelcome members . . . directly and immediately 
affects associational rights.”175 
Justice Ginsburg encounters a similar problem with her claim in 
Martinez that “[i]n diverse contexts, our decisions have distinguished 
between policies that require action and those that withhold benefits.”176 
Just as the distinction between DKT and Grove City College cannot hold, 
neither can a distinction between “action requiring” and “benefit 
withholding” policies. Almost every religion case requires a decision 
about whether to grant or withhold benefits. The special education 
services in Kiryas Joel,177 the newspaper in Rosenberger,178 and the 
classroom facilities in Good News Club179 all drew upon public funding. 
While Justice Ginsburg endorsed the funding line in all of these cases, 
her attempts to draw different lines are similarly problematic. The 
incarcerated adherents of “nonmainstream” religions in Cutter drew 
upon taxpayer dollars to support their religious practice180—as do most 
accommodations of religious practice in prisons and military settings. A 
religious exemption allowing John Leahy to apply for a driver’s license 
without providing his Social Security number would have increased 
administrative costs funded by tax dollars.181 In today’s bureaucratic 
 
 173. DKT, 887 F.2d at 301 n.2 (citation omitted). 
 174. Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2985 (2010) (quoting Roberts v. U.S. 
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 175. Id. (quoting Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 659 (2000)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted); see Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 633 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Protection 
of the association’s right to define its membership derives from the recognition that the formation of 
an expressive association is the creation of a voice, and the selection of members is the definition of 
that voice.”); Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 Yale L.J. 624, 688 (1980) 
(“One of the points of any freedom of association must be to let people make their own definitions of 
community.”). 
 176. 130 S. Ct. at 2986 (citing Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 575–76 (1984); Bob Jones 
Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S 574, 602–04 (1983)). 
 177. Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 692 (1994). 
 178. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 825 (1995). 
 179. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 102 (2001). 
 180. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 712–16 (2005). 
 181. See Leahy v. Dist. of Columbia, 833 F.2d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1987). But see id. at 1049 n.6 (noting 
that the District of Columbia already had in place a system for providing driver’s licenses to foreign 
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state, money is everywhere.182 And because the Supreme Court has 
equated the grant of tax-exempt status with a government subsidy,183 
presumably the government is subsidizing tens of thousands of religious 
and discriminatory organizations. 
These questions of funding are difficult, but in working toward a 
solution, the answer cannot be that generally available funding equitably 
distributed from a common pool means that the government is 
expressing a viewpoint or creating an unconstitutional subsidy. If that 
were true, then every campus ministry supported by a state-sponsored 
school would be violating the Establishment Clause, and every tax 
exemption granted to the Catholic Church would violate Fourteenth 
Amendment norms against gender discrimination. 
Of course, the tensions surrounding Justice Ginsburg’s efforts to 
navigate these funding questions are not hers alone. As Julie Nice has 
observed, the subsidy issue in Martinez “raises the perpetually troubling 
issue of the Court’s inconsistency about when such governmental 
conditions are unconstitutional.”184 The interplay between government 
speech and unconstitutional conditions creates a seemingly irresolvable 
tension.185 
In Martinez, Justice Ginsburg seems conflicted as to the threshold 
question of the government’s purpose in the “all-comers” policy. She 
notes approvingly that the policy “encourages tolerance, cooperation, 
and learning among students”186 and “conveys the Law School’s decision 
‘to decline to subsidize with public monies and benefits conduct of which 
 
diplomats, who lack Social Security numbers).  
 182. Stark money lines are largely unworkable and “neutral forms of aid” are the norm in 
Establishment Clause cases. Thomas C. Berg, Slouching Towards Secularism: A Comment on Kiryas 
Joel School District v. Grumet, 44 Emory L.J. 433, 456 (1995). 
 183. See Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 14 (1989) (“Every tax exemption constitutes a 
subsidy that affects non-qualifying taxpayers, forcing them to become indirect and vicarious ‘donors.’” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 
544 (1983) (“A tax exemption has much the same effect as a cash grant to the organization of the 
amount of tax it would have to pay on its income.”); see also Edward A. Zelinsky, Are Tax “Benefits” 
Constitutionally Equivalent to Direct Expenditures?, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 379, 380–81 (1998) (“The Court 
itself has equivocated, equating tax benefits and direct spending in some constitutional cases but not in 
others without indicating a rationale . . . .”). 
 184. Nice, supra note 120, at 648. 
 185. In Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 715 (2004), the Supreme Court concluded that the Free 
Exercise Clause did not require the State of Washington to fund theology degrees as part of a 
generally applicable scholarship fund. As Douglas Laycock has noted, Locke’s holding is that “when 
the state elects to fund a category of private-sector programs, it may facially discriminate against 
religious programs within the category.” Douglas Laycock, Theology Scholarships, the Pledge of 
Allegiance, and Religious Liberty: Avoiding the Extremes but Missing the Liberty, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 
155, 171 (2004). Laycock observes: “From the perspective of the Court’s cases on claims of a right to 
government funding, this holding is not surprising. From the perspective of the Court’s cases on 
discrimination against religion, it is remarkable.” Id. 
 186. Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2990 (2010). 
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the people of California disapprove.’”187 These normative assertions 
sound like government speech. They also express a viewpoint, which 
suggests that the suppression of a contrary perspective would represent a 
classic case of viewpoint discrimination.188 But Justice Ginsburg neither 
embraces a government speech rationale nor acknowledges the 
viewpoint discrimination. Instead, she characterizes the all-comers policy 
as “textbook viewpoint neutral” because it applies equally to all 
groups.189 The reality, of course, is that progressive groups with open 
membership policies will have few problems with an all-comers policy, 
but some conservative groups will face significant consequences. 
C. Equality 
My discussion of Martinez to this point has critiqued Justice 
Ginsburg’s neglect of the case’s religious liberty dimensions and her lack 
of clarity about the connection between money and speech. There is, 
however, a stronger constitutional argument throughout the opinion: 
Justice Ginsburg’s core commitment to equal dignity and equality of 
opportunity. The normative commitment to equality is the firmest 
constitutional grounding for Martinez. But it encounters important 
competing constitutional values pertaining to religious liberty and 
associational freedom. 
Justice Ginsburg may have best reflected her commitments to equal 
opportunity in her seminal opinion in United States v. Virginia, which 
ended the exclusion of women from state-supported military education 
at the Virginia Military Institute.190 But there are strong constitutional 
and political arguments that Martinez does not flow inevitably from 
United States v. Virginia. Most significantly, the Virginia Military 
Institute was a state actor—the message of exclusion was the message of 
the state. This was not the case with Martinez. Hastings College of the 
Law went out of its way to disclaim any official endorsement of 
recognized student organizations.191 The message of exclusion in 
 
 187. Id. (quoting Brief for Respondents at 35, Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (No. 08-1371)).  
 188. As Justice Souter noted in his Rosenberger dissent, in which Justice Ginsburg joined:  
Other things being equal, viewpoint discrimination occurs when government allows one 
message while prohibiting the messages of those who can reasonably be expected to 
respond. . . . “[When] the legislature’s suppression of speech suggests an attempt to give one 
side of a debatable public question an advantage in expressing its views to the people, the 
First Amendment is plainly offended.”  
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 894 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting) 
(quoting First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 455 U.S. 765, 785–86 (1978)). 
 189. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2993. 
 190. 518 U.S. 515, 519 (1996). Professor Siegel has called United States v. Virginia “perhaps her 
most important majority opinion.” Siegel, supra note 113, at 817. 
 191. CLS Brief, supra note 128, at 4. 
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Martinez came from a private religious group. In fact, far from reflecting 
anything close to a state norm, the views expressed in CLS’s membership 
policy run contrary to the reigning orthodoxy of the legal academy, the 
overwhelming majority of the faculty and administration at Hastings, and 
most of the students who attend the school. 
Conclusion 
There may be room for disagreement over how we should resolve 
the clash of constitutional values at issue in Martinez. But Justice 
Ginsburg’s opinion never poses that question. Instead, it mutes the 
religious liberty and associational dimensions of the case and further 
confounds the Court’s approach to the link between funding and 
expression. As a result, Martinez falls short in both scope and execution: 
We are left with neither a clear explanation of Justice Ginsburg’s 
equality commitments nor a plausible reason for ignoring the claims to 
religious expression and religious association. 
In August 2011, the Ninth Circuit relied on Martinez to suggest that 
a public university might be able to deny official recognition to Christian 
student groups because “their members and officers profess a specific 
religious belief, namely, Christianity.”192 That is in some ways the logical 
conclusion of Martinez, and it is cause for alarm. In the area of religious 
freedom, we are better served by an appreciation for the importance of 
religious practice and a concern for the ways in which limits on 
government funding can constrain constitutional freedoms—the very 
commitments that Justice Ginsburg showed us prior to Martinez. 
 
 
 192. Alpha Delta Chi-Delta Chapter v. Reed, 648 F.3d 790, 795–96 (9th Cir. 2011); see Truth v. 
Kent Sch. Dist., 542 F.3d 634, 644–45 (9th Cir. 2008) (“States have the constitutional authority to enact 
legislation prohibiting invidious discrimination. . . . [W]e hold that the requirement that members [of a 
high school Bible club] possess a ‘true desire to . . . grow in a relationship with Jesus Christ’ inherently 
excludes non-Christians . . . [thus violating] the District’s non-discrimination policies . . . .”). 
